The amendments initiated by the Georgian Dream on 18 June 2025 were urgently discussed in the Parliament of Georgia and adopted on 27 June in the third reading. The amendments abolish important guarantees of freedom of expression. Of particular concern is the abolition of qualified privilege and the shifting of the burden of proof for defamation from the plaintiff to the defendant. ¹ The provision on imposing civil liability for defamation is replaced by a reference to “appropriate liability.” The amendments concerning the protection of confidential sources and professional secrecy are also alarming. Additionally, the application of measures provided for by the law will be possible even before the adoption of the amendments, which, according to GYLA, violates the principle of legal certainty.

The changes are outlined below:

1. Abolition of qualified privilege and regulation of defamation against public figures

Qualified privilege was regulated as follows before the amendments: it protected the right to express oneself even in cases involving the dissemination of materially false information, provided that the person:

• took reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of the information but was unable to prevent the error and took effective measures to restore the reputation of the person harmed by the defamation;

• aimed to protect the legitimate interests of the public, and the benefit protected outweighed the harm caused;

• made the statement with the consent of the plaintiff;

• made the statement as a proportionate response to a statement made by the plaintiff against them;

• made a fair and accurate report on an event that was the subject of public attention. ²

The abolition of qualified privilege contradicts the standard of freedom of expression established by the Constitution and international treaties. In particular, the right to freedom of expression includes the right to insult, criticize, comment on, or speak about individuals, including aspects of their private lives. ³ The main purpose of qualified privilege is to facilitate public discourse about public and official figures, because the more prominent a public figure is—especially if they are a political figure or perform a public function and are a subject of public interest—the more tolerant they must be, in accordance with the principles of democratic pluralism, of the exchange of opinions, which may include even unsubstantiated, offensive, ⁴ or shocking information that concerns issues of public importance. 5

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also protects freedom of expression to a high standard in cases where the expression concerns persons active in the political sphere and public debates related to public institutions. ⁶ All public figures, including those holding the highest political authority, such as heads of state and government, are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition. ⁷ Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee considers it inadmissible to impose any restrictions on expression in order to protect the authorities, public institutions, or their representatives from criticism, disrespect, or defamation. ⁸

The abolition of qualified privilege directly contradicts these standards. By its very nature, qualified privilege allows individuals to participate in public political discourse and to criticize and express opinions about high-ranking officials, which is a legitimate right of citizens. The removal of Article 15 effectively abolishes this fundamental protection. Freedom of opinion and expression is a necessary condition for the full development of the individual. This right is essential for any healthy society, as it constitutes the cornerstone of all free and democratic societies.

2. Moving the burden of proof in defamation cases

The amendments also provide for shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant in defamation cases. Shifting the burden of proving the accuracy of expressions of opinion regarding public figures onto the defendant establishes a “presumption of falsity.” Journalists should be free to prove the truth of the facts stated in their publications simply by showing that they acted fairly and responsibly. ⁹ The previous provision in the law met this standard, and its amendment significantly lowers the standard of freedom of expression in Georgia.

Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant is a persistent problem in Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) brought against the media, where the cases are filed for a fictitious purpose and the plaintiff’s aim is not to protect their own rights, but to silence critical media voices. ¹⁰ Analysis of these types of cases reveals several problematic approaches by the judiciary, including: unusually fast consideration of claims within tight deadlines, improperly placing the burden of proof on the defendant in violation of freedom of expression, the court's formal approach to the merits of so-called defamation claims, and failure to assess a potential fictitious purpose. The reasoning in court decisions, especially in terms of striking a fair balance between privacy and freedom of expression, is also problematic. ¹¹ The recent legislative change will further exacerbate these issues and restrict media freedom, as the problematic judicial approach to burden-shifting will now be codified in formal legislation.

3. Removing civil liability from defamation cases

Article 13 of the previous version defined civil liability for defamation of a private person. In the new version, Article 13 replaces civil liability with the phrase “liability appropriate for defamation.” In addition to the fact that such wording is vague and unclear, it is concerning that during the parliamentary discussions, representatives of the Georgian Dream party expressed the view that it may be possible to establish criminal liability for defamation in the future. ¹²

Criminalizing defamation constitutes a gross interference in the sphere protected by freedom of expression. The UN Human Rights Committee has consistently called on states to refrain from criminalizing defamation ¹³. Within the legal framework of the Council of Europe and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, criminal penalties for defamation are widely considered disproportionate due to their chilling effect on freedom of expression. Courts have also found that the imposition of high fines can represent a disproportionate and unjustified restriction on the right to freedom of expression.¹⁴

Given that disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression are already prevalent in Georgia ¹⁵ ,introducing new narratives around the potential criminalization of defamation would set a dangerous precedent. The adoption of such legislative amendments would represent yet another tool for suppressing and persecuting critical voices.v

4. Standard for protecting confidential sources and professional secrecy

The amendments to the law also weaken the standard that previously protected individuals from being found guilty solely for refusing to disclose a confidential source, professional secret, or source of information. Generally, freedom of expression gains even greater importance in contexts where the activities and decisions of state actors are shielded from democratic or judicial scrutiny due to their confidential or secret nature. In such circumstances, the disclosure of information plays a crucial role in a democratic society, enabling civil society to oversee the actions of the government entrusted with protecting the public interest. ¹⁶ Weakening this standard will inevitably result in reduced protection for journalists who expose corruption or misconduct by high-ranking officials or public figures. This, in turn, will lead to a less informed public and undermine the core purpose of freedom of expression.

5. Violation of the legal certainty principle

The fact that the law applies retroactively for 100 days prior to the adoption of the amendments is also concerning, as it violates the principle of legal certainty. Legal theory indicates that the principle of legal certainty aims to protect and maintain the reasonable expectations of individuals, ¹⁷ which is a practical consequence of the constitutionally guaranteed principle of a rule of law-based state. ¹⁸ “The quality of the law requires that legislative regulation be so clear that the person whose rights are being interfered with is able to adequately understand the legal situation and conduct their actions accordingly.” ¹⁹ “A person must be able to determine exactly what the legislator requires of them and adjust their behavior to meet that requirement.” ²⁰ In this case, a person could not have—and was not expected to have—any expectations regarding the legislative amendments. Therefore, extending the legal effects of the amendments to actions taken before their adoption is inconsistent with the principle of legal certainty. Such a precedent further harms and erodes the protection of freedom of expression as an instrumental right.

Conclusion

The amendments to the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression are yet another example of the Georgian Dream’s repressive policy aimed at restricting freedom of expression, political discourse, pluralism, media, and civil space. Building on previous practices that included human rights-incompatible amendments to the Law on Broadcasting and administrative sanctions for comments made on social media, these amendments will be used repressively against citizens and critical media.

1 Draft Law: “On Amendments to the Law of Georgia “On Freedom of Speech and Expression” https://info.parliament.ge/#law-drafting/31001  [24.06.25].

2 See the version of the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression before the amendment of Article 15.

3 Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), Applications nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, 2012. § 109 – 113.

4 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, Application no. 37698/97, 2000, § 30 – 31.

5 Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 13585/88, 1991, § 59.

6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19..

7 Marques de Morais v. Angola, No. 1128/2002, UN human rights committee, 2005. § 3.9, 6.8.

8 UN HRC General Comment No. 34, 2011, § 11.

9 Wall Street Journal Europe Sprland Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) Application no. 28577/05, 2009.  Radio France and Others v. France,Application no. 53984/00, 2009,  § 24; Standard Verlags GmbH and Krawagna-Pfeifer v. Austria, Application no. 19710/02, 2006, § 16, 30, 57.

10 See more SLAPP Cases in Georgia: A New Security for Freedom, GDI, 2023. https://gdi.ge/storage/files/doc/SLAPP%20%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98.pdf (in georgian) [24.06.25]

11 GYLA responds to the developments surrounding “TV Pirveli”. 30.07.2024. https://gyla.ge/en/post/saia-ekhmaineba-tv-pirveli-is-irgvliv-ganvitarebul-movlenebs   [24.06.25].

12 Tea Tsulukiani - It would be good to think that defamation would at least be considered an aggravating circumstance in the substantive criminal code. https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/842301-tea-culukiani-kargi-ikneba-vipikrot-rom-sisxlis-samartlis-materialur-kodeksshi-ciliscameba-damamzimebel-garemoebad-mainc-iknas-michneuli/  [24.06.25].

13 Concluding observations on Italy (CCPR/C/ITA/CO/5) § 19; concluding observations on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CCPR/C/MKD/CO/2), § 6.

14 Axel Springer AG v. Germany, Application no. 39954/08) 2012, § 83-84.

15 Prosecution of politicians for evaluative judgments creates a precedent for mass censorship https://gyla.ge/en/post/cenzuris-precendentebi-gyla   [24.06.25].

16 Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, app. No 49085/0748, 2016 48; Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], Application no. 69698/01 2009, § 110.

17 See for a review of the principle of certainty in relation to Convention rights: John McGarry, ‘Effecting Legal Certainty under the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 17(1) European Human Rights Law Review.

18 Eremadze K., “Balancing Interests in a Democratic Society,” ed.: Joni Khetsuriani, Giorgi Papuashvili, Konstantine Vardzelashvili, 2013, 131.

19 Ibid., 133, citation: Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia of December 26, 2007 in case #1/3/407 Georgian Young Lawyers Association

and Georgian citizen Ekaterine Lomtatidze v. Parliament of Georgia, II, 11.

20 Ibid., 133, citation: Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia of October 26, 2007

#2/2/389 in the case of Georgian citizen Maia Natadze and Others against the Parliament of Georgia and the President of Georgia, II, 6.